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Abstract 
 
  Using individual level data, this paper examines how and to what extent behavior 
and perception of those bringing lawsuit’s differ between large district courts 
(competitive lawyer market) and medium or small district ones (less competitive lawyer 
markets). The major findings are; (1) in medium or small, but not large districts, trial 
experience discourages people from employing a lawyer. (2) A natural person is less 
likely to employ a lawyer than a legal entity in medium or small districts, but not in 
large ones. (3) The self-rated cost of searching for a lawyer is lower in large districts 
than small ones. It follows from these results that the lower competitive pressure in the 
lawyer markets in medium and small districts results in higher costs to employ a 
lawyer than is found in large districts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that Japanese appear less likely to engage in litigation. It 
is claimed in a classic work on the topic that this might be because of the harmonious 
nature of Japanese society (Kawashima, 1963). Contrarily, it has been argued that the 
institutional incapacity of the legal system in Japan has resulted in an insufficient 
supply of judges and lawyers. As a consequence, the high cost of litigation means people 
are reluctant to engage in litigation (Haley 1978) 1. In the long run, institutional 
incapacity and regulation of the lawyer market has caused a great loss for Japanese 
economy (Kinoshita, 2000; 2002). 
During the 1990s, an increase in litigation was observed in Japan. By using 
prefectural level data, Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) suggested that the increase was 
mainly due to the expansion of institutional capacity and structural changes in the 
Japanese economy. However, the supply of lawyers and the amount of litigation has 
been disproportionally concentrated in mega-cities such as Tokyo and Osaka (Nakazato 
et al., 2006; Yamamura 2008) 2. Remarkable increases in lawyers and litigation were 
only observed in mega cities (Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006).  
In 1999, the government of Japan established the Justice System Reform Council 
(JSRC hereafter) for the purpose of studying basic policies and modifying the legal 
system. The JSRC put forward various policies, some aimed at increasing the number of 
people engaging in lawsuits (JSRC 2001), as lawyers are thought to play an important 
                                                   
1 Numbers of studies examine the reluctance for litigation in Japan from the viewpoint 
of economics (e.g., Ramseyer, 1988; Ramseyer and Nakazato, 1989; 1999).  
2 It should be noted that, besides lawyers, there are many others who provide legal 
services; for example shiho shoshi (legal scriveners), benrishi (patent agents) as well as 
unlicensed graduates of law faculties (Ramseyer and Nakazato 1999:10-12, Nakazato et 
al. 2006). 
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role as agents of those bringing a lawsuit. For the legal reform to be successful, it will be 
important to enhance the ability of people to employ lawyers when they are involved in 
a conflict. In Japan, however, the costs of searching for a lawyer appear to be large 
because information about the lawyer market is not sufficiently widespread. Hence, it is 
important to consider the question of how to access information about the lawyer 
market. Those who have already experienced a lawsuit can more easily access 
information about the market for lawyers. Experience of a lawsuit is thus expected to 
reduce the costs of searching for a lawyer, leading to their increased use.    
Under conditions that the market is not competitive as a result of the short supply of 
lawyers, the number of people using lawyers is expected to be smaller than those in the 
equilibrium of a competitive market, even if people have sufficient information. Hence, 
it seems to depend on the market conditions whether learning from experience leads to 
an increase of those using lawyers. In Japan, the lawyer market in mega-cities is 
considered to differ from those found in other areas (Nakazato et al., 2006). This paper 
examines how different lawyer market conditions influence the effect of learning on 
lawyer employment, by using an individual level data set. With the exception of 
Nakazato et al. (2006), existing empirical economic work concerning the Japanese legal 
service industry use aggregated level data (e.g., Milhaoupt and West 2004; Kinoshita 
2000; 2002; Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006; Yamamura 2008). This paper makes a 
contribution by using individual level data to more precisely examine the lawyer 
market in Japan and so provide policy implications.  
 
2. Data and Method  
2.1. Data 
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This paper used the individual level data constructed from the Survey of Civil Action 
Users conducted in 2000 (SCAU 2000 hereafter)3. The survey was conducted to provide 
fundamental data to investigate “the state of a civil action system, is it easy for people 
to use?” The subjects of the survey were those involved in incidents that were settled by 
civil-affairs, usual being a lawsuit brought in a district court. A total of 1,612 natural 
and legal persons were sent letters asking them to participate in the survey. The survey 
ultimately collected data on 591 natural and legal persons, a response rate of 36.6%. 
Respondents for legal persons were those in charge of the judicial matter. Spatial unit 
consists of sixteen district courts in Japan4 . When the selection of subjects was 
performed, a “Sufficient balance of local characteristics and residence were considered 
to reflect the national situation”5.  
The sample used for the estimations was 354, since some observations were deleted 
because of missing values. Observations divided into large and other (small and 
medium size) district courts were 145 and 209, respectively.  
 
2.2. Method 
Definitions of variables used for the estimations are in Table 1. Mean values of large 
districts and the small or medium ones are also recorded.  
This paper examines the determinants for employing a lawyer when a person has 
                                                   
3 The data for this secondary analysis were from the "Survey of Civil Action Users 
(Minji Sosho Riyo-sha Chosa)”. The survey was conducted by the Justice System Reform 
Council (Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingi-kai) in 2000. The data was provided by the Social 
Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, 
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
4 The selected courts are located in Sapporo, Akita, Fukushima, Maebashi, Tokyo, 
Toyama, Kofu, Shizuoka, Otsu, Osaka, Matsue, Okayama, Matsuyama, Fukuoka, 
Niyazaki, Naha.  
5 Abstract of “SCAU 2000” (http://ssjda.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/abstract/0198a.html accessed 
at June 9, 2009). 
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experienced a trial. Restricting samples to those who have employed a lawyer, this 
paper also explores the question about their considerations of the costs involved 
searching for a lawyer. Therefore, a two-stage selection model is employed to control for 
the selection bias.  
The function for the estimation of lawyer employment takes the following form: 
 
(The first stage estimation) 
LAWYER i= 0 + 1 EXPEi + 2 AMOUNT i +3NATUi +4LARGEi +5COMPLi + ui , 
where LAWYERi represents the dependent variable in person i. ’s represents 
regression parameters. ui represents the error term. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if a person employs lawyer when he/she experienced a 
trial, otherwise 0. Hence, a Probit model is employed for estimations. After selecting 
those who have used a lawyer, the self-rated cost of searching for a lawyer is examined. 
The self-rated cost of searching is measured using the question “Did you have a hard 
time searching for a lawyer?”. The responses ran from 0 (No, not at all) to 5 (Yes, very 
hard). I defined those that took 0-2 as the low-cost group, and those taking 3-5 as the 
high-cost group. SCOST takes 1 in the case of the high-cost group, otherwise 0. A 
Heckman Probit model (Probit model with sample selection) is used for the estimation 
of SCOST since Probit estimation is conducted in the second stage after the first stage 
selection. Probit estimation as above is conducted in the first stage and then the second 
stage estimated function takes the following form: 
 
(The second stage estimation) 
SCOST i= 0 + 1 EXPEi +2NATUi +3LARGEi +4ACQUAi +5COMPLi + ei, 
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As presented in Table1, LAWYER is larger in large district courts than in small or 
medium district ones, while SCOST is larger in small or medium sized district courts 
than in large district ones. This implies that people can more easily search for lawyers 
and are more likely to employ them in mega city based courts than those in small or 
medium size areas. 
The independent variables used for the estimations are as follows. Past trial 
experience is incorporated to capture the learning effect. The first time participant in a 
lawsuit appears to have very little knowledge about the lawyer market, and therefore 
does not know a reasonable retainer for employing a lawyer. However, through 
experience, people acquire the information about what is a reasonable retainer. 
Therefore, in the lawyer market, information asymmetry between persons (demand) 
and lawyer (supply) decreases as persons experience trials.  
If the market is not competitive because of a shortage in the supply of lawyers, 
lawyers come to have monopolistic power over the market. As a consequence, lawyers’ 
wages become higher than an equilibrium wage in a competitive market when quantity 
lessens to below the equilibrium level of a competitive market. This conjecture is 
supported by Nakazato et al. (2006) suggesting that lawyers working in under-lawyered 
provinces can earn scarcity and monopoly rents not available in the far more 
competitive Tokyo market. In this case, and if other things are equal, persons with 
experience are less likely to employ a lawyer since they know that the retainer for a 
lawyer is higher than the wage in a competitive market6. Therefore, the sign of EXPE is 
                                                   
6 Tokyo sees more complex litigation and business transactions than do other places in 
Japan. Therefore, talented lawyers are more inclined to work in Tokyo and earn higher 
incomes than less talented lawyers, despite the competitive Tokyo market. However, 
lawyers in Tokyo cannot earn scarcity and monopoly incentives because of the 
competitive pressure (Nakazato et al., 2006).  
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expected to be negative in the first stage estimation. In the second stage estimation, the 
experience of a lawsuit is thought to reduce the cost of searching for a lawyer since 
those people are likely to be acquainted with a lawyer through their past experience7. 
Even if people are not acquainted with lawyers, their experience of a trial seems to 
increase their information about the lawyer market and therefore reduce search costs. 
Therefore, EXPE and ACQUA are anticipated to take negative sings in the second stage 
estimation. 
 The larger the amount of money involved in a lawsuit, the larger the loss becomes if 
a person loses the suit. Therefore, large amounts of money lead to people retaining a 
lawyer to help in winning the suit. Inevitably, AMOUNT is anticipated to take a positive 
sign in the first stage. The amount of money involved in a lawsuit is not associated with 
the cost of searching for a lawyer. Hence, in the second stage, AMOUNT is not 
incorporated as an independent variable. 
   A legal person appears inclined to employ a corporate type of lawyer. If this is true, a 
corporation’s cost of searching for a lawyer is 0. As a consequence, natural persons are 
less likely to employ a lawyer and their costs of searching become higher than those for 
a corporation. Therefore, the expected sign of NATU is negative in the first stage but 
positive in the second. According to earlier works (Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006; 
Yamamura 2008), lawyers and litigation are concentrated in mega cities such as Tokyo 
and Osaka. If this is the case, the supply of lawyers is larger and so the market is more 
                                                   
7 Sato et al. (2006) also used SCAU data to suggest that acquaintances of lawyers made 
up about 20 % of those who employed a lawyer for litigation (Sato et al., 2006, p.229). In 
the SCAU survey, those who employed a lawyer were asked how they accessed the 
lawyer employed. There were 10 choices that included “acquainted with a lawyer”, 
“introduction by a relative or colleague”,” introduction through the bar association etc... 
ACQUA can be available when the sample is restricted to those who employed a lawyer. 
This is the reason why ACQUA cannot be incorporated into the first-stage estimated 
function where probability of employing a lawyer is estimated.  
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competitive in mega cities than in other parts of Japan. The sign of LARGE is thus 
expected to be positive in the first stage and negative in the second. As a control 
variable, COMPL is incorporated to control for the difference between complainants and 
defendants both in the first and second stages.   
  
3. Estimation results  
Estimation results of the intention to employ a lawyer are presented in Table 2 and 
those of the costs involved searching for a lawyer are in Table 3. In Table 2, the results 
using all samples, as well as those of the large district courts samples and small or 
medium district court samples are presented8. In both Tables 2 and 3, marginal effects 
are exhibited. 
I now discuss the results concerning the employment of lawyers in Table 2. 
Coefficients of EXPE take negative signs in all estimations. As shown in Columns (2) 
and (3), the results using the large district samples are not statistically significant, 
whereas the results using small or medium ones are statistically significant at the 1 % 
level. Also, the absolute value of the coefficient for small or medium sized areas is 0.05, 
which is approximately 10 times larger than that for mega cities. This implies that the 
past experience of trials discourages people from employing a lawyer in a medium or 
small size district, but not in a large one. This is consistent with the conjecture that 
learning has a detrimental effect on employment of lawyers if the lawyer market is not 
competitive9.  
                                                   
8 In Table 3, only the results of all samples are shown. Estimations using the large 
district courts samples and the small or medium areas ones are attempted but the 
coefficients fail to settle down because of the non-convergence. As a consequence, results 
using split samples cannot be reported. 
9 Another interpretation about the negative sign of EXPE is that in Japan there is a lot 
of Honnin Sosho (litigation without lawyers). The experience of litigation leads 
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The sign of NATU is negative despite being statistically insignificant. I interpret 
this result as suggesting that the barrier for natural persons to enter the lawyer market 
is higher than for legal persons. After splitting samples, it is interesting to observe that 
NATU takes a positive sign in large districts courts whereas it takes significant 
negative signs in small or medium districts. The absolute coefficient value of the latter 
is 0.20, which is 20 times larger than that of the former. This means that there is no 
difference in lawyer retention between natural and legal persons in large districts. On 
the other hand, natural persons are less likely to retain a lawyer than are legal persons 
in small or medium districts. That is, a barrier for natural persons to enter the lawyer 
market is observed only in small or medium size district courts. This barrier is partly 
caused by the costs involved searching for lawyers. I conjecture that the search cost 
seems to be significantly higher in small or medium districts than in large districts. To 
more closely examine search costs, Heckma Probit estimations are conducted and the 
results are discussed later.  
I now turn to Table 3, where the results of the estimations of the costs of searching 
are set out. ACQUA produces the predicted negative sign and is statistically significant 
at the 1 % level, indicating that being an acquaintance of a lawyer reduces the search 
cost. In both columns (1) and (2), NATU takes positive signs while being statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. This means that natural persons incur higher search costs 
than do legal persons. This is consistent with the estimation of lawyer employment as 
argued above. 
 Coefficients of LARGE are significant negative signs in columns (1) and (2). In my 
interpretation, there are not only large numbers of lawyers but also various types of 
                                                                                                                                                     
corporations to revert to Honnin Shosho, probably because they do not need the help of 
lawyers. 
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lawyers in large districts. Because of this condition, it is easier to resolve the problem of 
matching between people (demand) and lawyers (supply) in the lawyer market of large 
district courts. This leads me to argue that a large search cost is thought to discourage 
natural persons from employing a lawyer, especially in medium and small district 
courts. Furthermore, the negative sign of LARGE is evidence that the lawyers market 
in a large district court is more competitive. 
Taken together, the combined results of Tables 2 and 3 make it evident that the 
more competitive the lawyer market (large districts), the smaller the negative effect of 
experience on retaining a lawyer and on the costs of searching for a lawyer. From this I 
derive the argument that the lawyer market in medium and small size districts should 
be more competitive to expand the numbers of people using lawyers.  
 
4. Conclusion 
  This paper examined how and the extent to which the behavior and perception of 
those who participate in lawsuits differ between district courts in large areas and those 
in medium or small areas. The major findings can be summarized as follows. Trial 
experience discourages people from employing a lawyer in less competitive markets 
(medium or small districts). Costs involved searching for lawyers are lower in more 
competitive markets (large district); implying that the lower competitive pressure of the 
lawyer market in medium and small districts results in higher costs to employ a lawyer 
than in large districts10.  
  It was found that people living in non-urban areas in Japan are more inclined to 
                                                   
10 As suggested in Figure 2 of Yamamura (2008), the ratio of lawyers to population in 
large urban areas (about 0.06 % in Tokyo and Osaka) is 6 times larger than other areas 
(about 0.01 %). 
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resort to informal normative rules than they do to formal ones (Yamamura, 2008). The 
findings of this paper suggest that a reluctance to litigate in non-urban areas can be 
partly explained by the market conditions which are characterized by the short supply 
of lawyers. The racially homogenous feature of Japan is expected to decline as a result 
of increases in immigrant numbers, and so the perception of Japanese persons will 
change (Yamamura 2009). Therefore, as the harmonious nature of Japanese society 
gradually declines, informal rules will be thought of as being less effective in the long 
run. As argued by Greif (1994; 2002), formal rules lead to more efficiency in the long run 
than do informal ones, so whether an informal rule-oriented society transits to the 
formal rule oriented one is crucial to increases in social benefits. Hence, I found it is 
important that the non-urban lawyer market is made more competitive and that there 
is an increase in the numbers of people using lawyers in those areas. The bifurcated 
lawyer market in Japan needs to be eliminated.   
  Because of the limitations of the data used in this paper, some important issues could 
not be explored. For instance, the searching costs for those who did not employ lawyers 
are not considered when searching costs are examined. The effect of being acquainted 
with a lawyer on the decision to employ is thought important but was not investigated. 
These are issues remaining to be addressed in future studies. 
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